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U.S. members of the Technical Cooperative Program (TTCP) and the 
Naval Postgraduate School continue the work of an earlier Action Group on 
coalition network centric maritime warfare.  The current terms of reference 
require defining in functional terms the levels of coalition interoperability with 
FORCEnet and assessing the incremental value of higher levels of 
interoperability as input to national balance of investment studies.  The goal was 
to develop a high-level system architecture for C4ISR in a coalition maritime 
force.  Four student teams followed U.S. DoD instructions for applying systems 
engineering in a capabilities-based approach, examining all DOTMLPF 
implications.  The result was four Capabilities Development Documents with 
supporting DoD Architecture Framework products. 
To provide a common basis to compare different architectures, three 
tactical situations were used.  This bounded the scope of the problem by listing 
the blue force and red force platforms.  Focusing on a specific non-combat 
operation, a littoral defense operation, and a littoral strike operation provided 
the foundation for measures of effectiveness in the comparison. 
Modeling and simulation of the architectures with a PC-based discrete 
event simulation tool was completed.  The results indicate a clear advantage to 
coalition platforms operating in a true network-centric fashion, with quantifiable 





FORCEnet is the US Navy’s instantiation of network centric warfare.1  It encompasses 
both the materiel and non-materiel solutions required to harness information networking 
to achieve an order of magnitude increase in combat power, increased efficiency and 
flexibility in force structure, and improved ability to overcome new asymmetric threats.  
FORCEnet development for coalition operational environments is nascent.  Successful 
materiel solutions dedicated to providing human-centered command and control support 
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have been fielded outside of traditional acquisition processes (early versions of coalition 
wide-area networks (COWAN) fielded in the Pacific area of operations).  Indeed, 
realizing a complete information-age transformation of the maritime forces of just a 
single nation is a long-term and challenging goal. 
 
Given the enormous investment of resources implied in realizing these war-fighting 
advantages, the questions for any long-term US ally are: Should we make the same 
investment in order to maintain interoperability?  How can we quantify the costs and 
benefits resulting from such a decision?  In the course of their usual business, The 
Technical Cooperation Program (TTCP)* Maritime Systems Group (MAR) has taken on 





In early 2004, TTCP chartered an Action Group (AG-1) on coalition network-centric 
maritime warfare analysis to address a perceived lack of quantitative analysis in this area, 
and assist in program development.2  AG-1 established two projects to study NCMW in 
breadth and depth, and completed its work in September 2004. 
 
Action Group (AG-6) was chartered to extend the work to examine the implications of 
FORCEnet for a coalition maritime force.  AG-6 is expected to offer significant mutual 
benefit by providing timely insights and guidance that will enable harmonizing national 
coalition C4I interoperability strategies and development plans.  Their terms of reference 
are: 
• Build on results and findings of AG-1 and initiate a follow-on study – FORCEnet 
Implications for Coalitions 
• Examine the implications and way ahead for realizing coalition capabilities that 
are compatible with both the functionality and the timeline of the U.S. Navy’s 
FORCEnet initiative 
• MAR leadership seeks to define in functional terms the various levels of coalition 
interoperability with FORCEnet and to assess the incremental value of higher 
levels of interoperability to provide input to national balance of investment 
studies 
• A transnational need is also recognized to harmonize national NCMW functional 
and technical roadmaps to support effective netted coalition capabilities and 
assessment of priorities 
More specifically, “MAR directs AG-6 to pick one or two challenging scenarios in the 
littoral that capitalize on Fn and examine its benefits and undertake a sensitivity 
analysis.”3 
 
Members of TTCP agreed with Naval Postgraduate School faculty members that the 
above problem was a worthy topic for student research.  Indeed, the timing was such that 
two separate cohorts of students enrolled in the Masters of Science in Systems 
                                                 
* TTCP is a collaborative exchange program in non-nuclear defense science and technology between the 
governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, United Kingdom and United States. 
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Engineering program were just starting their capstone project.  The capstone project 
serves as a final synthesis of the entire SE curriculum. It brings together as many 
elements of the curriculum as possible in a comprehensive overview of the components 
and underlying technologies of modern warfare.  In short, it is an opportunity for our 
students to prove they can “do” systems engineering:  decompose complex problems, 
propose rational solutions, analyze and recommend the best solution, and communicate 
the results.  Of course, this is all done with the tools and processes required of any DoD 
system proposal from a complete doctrine, organization, training, materiel, logistics, 
personnel & leadership, and facilities (DOTMLPF) perspective.4 
 
The project’s overall purpose was to provide analysis and guidance on the tactical and 
technical requirements for coalition maritime warfare interoperability.  Emphasis was 
placed on the alignment of coalition national acquisition strategies with FORCEnet.  The 
goal was to develop a high-level system architecture to accomplish the specified missions 
in a true network-centric fashion.  The final report was in the form of a Capabilities 
Development Document with supporting products from the DoD Architecture 
Framework as outlined in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3170.01C, 
Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System. 
 
 
Approach and Task Scope 
 
The approach was to define in functional terms various levels of interoperability with 
FORCEnet, to assess the incremental value of higher levels of interoperability via 
coalition strike group modeling and simulation, and to provide input to national balance 
of investment studies.  Emphasis was placed on military operations in the littorals.  
Additionally, to limit the scope of the project and to provide a framework for realistic 
measures of effectiveness, three tactical situations were provided.  All were to take place 
in the 2010-2015 time frame, consistent with the goals of AG-6, so the results could be 
used to affect FY08 investment decisions.  The scenarios agreed upon by the key 
stakeholders were: 
• A non-combatant evacuation of an island nation in the face of coup sponsored by 
a near-peer competitor.  
• Repel a threatening invasion force by a near-peer competitor of a smaller, less 
well-defended ally. 
• Re-establish sovereignty on a disputed island that was wrongfully occupied by a 
near-peer competitor. 
The major platforms participating in a coalition force were also defined.  They were 
composed of mostly US ships with ships from other nations participating.  There would 
be a carrier strike group and an expeditionary strike group. 
 
Because of the size of the class, the students were divided into 4 teams: 
1. Carrier strike group, with emphasis on surface and anti-air warfare 
2. Expeditionary strike group, with emphasis on surface and anti-air warfare 
3. Carrier strike group, with emphasis on submarine and mine warfare 
4. Expeditionary strike group, with emphasis on submarine and mine warfare 
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Given that the students were civilian employees of Naval Surface Warfare Center in Port 
Hueneme, CA and Naval Undersea Warfare Center in Keyport, WA, this separation 
based on warfare domains seemed logical. 
 
The student teams started with a gap analysis between “as-is” architectures and the 
required capabilities of a truly network-enabled force.  The “as-is” architectures were 
based on those systems in use during the RIMPAC 04 exercise and Trident Warrior 04 
experiments.5  They developed C4ISR system architectures that provided the functional 
capabilities required of network-centric forces.  A complete DOTMLPF spectrum was 
examined, including changes to doctrine on security enclaves and strike group 
organization to achieve force-level data fusion of all engagement quality track 
information.   
 
The architectures were modeled using a commercially available discrete-event simulation 
tool (Extend by ImagineThat, Inc.)  Several of the more technically challenging aspects 
of creating and sharing common operational pictures, such as data fusion, and sharing 
engagement-quality track data were modeled in a very rudimentary way.  Threat analysis 
and weapons assignment algorithms were kept simple.  Other simplifying assumptions 
common to all groups was the availability of bandwidth; system reliability; and 
information assurance.  While in reality, we know that data throughput between 
battlespace entities is limited by their access to shared assets like satellite communication 
systems; we wanted to focus on how those connections were used.  No system failures 
were modeled for this first exercise.  Offensive information operations by red and blue 
forces were also not modeled in this project.  The point was to examine the functional 
capabilities of network centricity and analyze the effectiveness of a force operating under 
net-centric concepts compared to one operating with as-is concepts.  Simulations were 
run with “full” FORCEnet, “partial” FORCEnet, and no FORCEnet.  The platforms with 
their organic sensor and weapon systems (with the associated probabilities of detection 
and probabilities of kill) were kept the same between simulations.  Only the connectivity 
and allowable emergent behavior were varied. 
 
All groups created similar system architectures.  This is to be expected, given the 
common problem and common required capabilities of each group.  Figure 1 shows the 
OV-1 High-Level Operational Concept Graphic from the AAW- and ASuW-focused 
CSG team.6  It is worthy to note that non-US assets are depicted as equal partners in the 
strike group.  All the key enablers for network centricity are identified as attributes of the 
network and the use of out-of-theater ISR assets is considered.  Figure 2 and Figure 3 
show the OV-5 Operational Activity Model from the AAW- and ASuW-focused ESG 
team.7  All teams were directed to start with the warfighters’ mission in mind.  So, it is 
not surprising again that each team created products that were similar and patterned after 
the classic observe-orient-decide-act paradigm.  The DoD Architecture Framework does 
not specify a single modeling language for any of the required graphical products.  As our 
students have all been exposed to IDEF0, Hatley-Pirbhai, UML, and several other tools, 
we found a mix of all of them in the final products delivered. 
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The modeling and simulation conducted were based on the lower levels of abstraction of 
this OV-5 Operational Activity Model.  Figure 4 shows the high level block diagram of 
the model used and Figure 5 provides some detail in the interaction between the 
spreadsheet used for detection and engagement calculation and the discrete-event 


























































































Figure 2: OV-5 Operational Activity Model (Top Level) 
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Students created all hierarchical blocks and linked sensor and weapon performance based 
on effectiveness estimates found in the open literature.  Each group approached the 
modeling problem in a similar manner.   
 
The differences were, for the most part, minor.  The red forces and blue forces are 
represented as items passing through the blocks.  Each has its own sensors and weapons 
and they are tracked based on their geographic location.  Their interaction is simulated in 
each block.  This included platform movement, detections, and engagements.  Each time 
step of the simulation allowed the platforms to move, new detections and updates to 
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Figure 4: Model Block Diagram 
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existing tracks were made, and weapon engagements (if any) were processes based on 
estimated effectiveness probabilities compared to random numbers generators. 
 
Figure 6: Extend Model 
 
In the “with FORCEnet” scenarios, the “pass messages” block updated the blue force’s 
common operational picture with fused data and ensured that all platforms had the data.  
The most powerful aspect of the students’ architecture design is evidenced in this block 
as no distinction is made between platforms based on nationality.  The “handle 
engagements” block performed group-wide threat evaluation and weapons assignment 
and went on to assess the effectiveness of each engagement.  Red on blue engagements 
were executed in this block as well.  In the “no FORCEnet” scenario, the “pass 
messages” block did not permit cross-platform data fusion or information sharing.  The 
“handle engagements” block only computed engagements based on each platform’s 
organic sensor information. 
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Figure 5: Model Detail 
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The simulations were conducted to quantify the effectiveness of FORCEnet operations.  
That is, metrics were gathered over many iterations of the model and translated into 
operational measures of effectiveness (MOEs).  Measures of effectiveness were chosen 
by students based on our guidance.  Emphasis was on war-fighter effectiveness, 
consistent with JCIDS direction and good systems engineering practice.  That is, 
attributes specific to sub-systems such as latency, packet loss, etc, were not analyzed in 
detail.  Rather, measures that specifically have meaning for the war-fighter were 
analyzed.  For example, number and percentage of red forces countered over a fixed time, 
number and percentage of blue forces surviving over a fixed time, and overall force-level 
weapon efficiency.  A typical set of MOEs with supporting measures of performance 
(MOP) is listed in the below table.8 
 
MOE 1 Capability to evaluate pre-engagement situation: In this, the Observation Phase of an operation, the 
battle force must determine the presence, capability, and projected intent of hostile forces. 
MOP a) Measure ability to maintain track on all active tracks 
MOP b) Measure percent of operating area (OPAREA) occupied by opposing forces 
MOP c) Objective measure degree of confidence in intelligence data 
MOP d) Measure separation between hostiles and allies/non-combatants 
MOP e) Measure hostile movement 
MOP f) Categorize enemy presence  
MOE 2 Determine scope of battle-space: Measure anticipated impact of weather predictions on 
communications, ability to prioritize threats. 
MOE  3 Capability to determine posture and orientation of the mission. 
MOP a) Measure of evacuees to extract per capabilities 
MOP b) Readiness of equipment per system 
MOP c) Ratio of weapons per threat 
MOP d) Measure sortie rate available 
MOP e) Objective measure of anticipated impact of weather predictions on operations and 
communications  
MOE 4 Ability to translate commanders’ decisions into plans and orders. 
MOP a) Ability to maintain track on all active tracks 
MOP b) Battle field picture refresh rate 
MOP c) Objective measure of information completeness 
MOP d) Maximum number of different military units that can be connected to command 
when needed 
MOP e) Number of requests for clarification regarding previously distributed commander’s 
intent 
MOP f) Number of mishaps due to friendly fire  
MOE 5 Capability to carry out prescribed response during mission. 
MOP a) Probability of kill 
MOP b) Casualty rates 
MOP c) Effectiveness of system for MOOTH 
MOP d) Number of operations redirected before completion as result of enemy reactions  
MOE 6 System Suitability: Improved connectivity between systems comes at a cost to operational units. The 
connectivity must be established, maintained, and periodically changed to comply with changing 
situations. The time required to accomplish these tasks are in addition to any existing C4I system 
requirements, but should significantly reduce the operational load on those other systems. 
MOP a) Amount of time required to establish communications network 
MOP b) Amount of time required to perform maintenance 
MOP c) Percentage of time communication network operational 
MOP d) Number of units reporting loss of connection 







The four student teams delivered reports that, understandably, exhibited many similarities 
and a few differences with each other.  This paper seeks to present those aspects of the 
reports that speak directly to comparing the proposed “purely” network-centric 
architectures with those in use today.  One group did report an unusual result that will be 
discussed shortly. 
 
Due to time constraints, not all MOEs were measured, but only those that focused on the 
self-defense aspects of the scenarios rather than on the offensive aspects.  For example, 
from the above list, only the following were measured: 
• Number and percentage of red platforms tracked 
• Number of engagements 
• Number and percentage of red force hard kills 
• Number and percentage of blue force attrition 
• Time to send engagement and platform status 
In general, the total combat effectiveness of the coalition force was improved in terms of 
number of red force attrition, blue force survival, engagement sustainability, and hard-kill 
weapons efficiency.  With FORCEnet, statistics for red detections in the operational area 
show an increase of 70 to 100% at any time step.  This enabled faster engagements.  The 
statistics show that roughly 50% of all kills and 50% of all engagements happen quicker 
with FORCEnet.  Other groups couched this speed of engagement result as a reduction in 
time from initial detection to engagement.  Improvements of 22 to 41% were noted.  
Efficiency in terms of number of weapons used improved by 20 to 50%. Another benefit 
shown by the model is a 45% reduction of blue force cumulative attrition.  Surprisingly, 
the number of red forces killed increased by only 10 to 15%.  Also, the measure of raid 
annihilation proved inconclusive with improvements of only a few percent. 
One of the more striking results was the increase in potential number of weapons on a 
target as an indicator of effective engagement envelope improvement.  That is, for 
purposes of weapon assignment, the netted force had more options with regard to which 
platform could engage an enemy.  Figure 7 (taken from one simulation) shows this quite 
clearly.9  
11 
Figure 7: Increase in weapons on target 
The shades of blue vary with the number of weapons that could engage a target in each 
respective area.  The figure on the left shows that each platform can only engage those 
targets tracked with organic sensors.  In network-centric simulations, they can engage 
targets tracked by any platform’s sensors.  The figure on the right shows that this 
translates into more potential weapons on target.  What that means to the warfighter is 
increased efficiency in automatically selecting the optimum weapon across the entire 
group and more engagement opportunities resulting in an increased probability of kill.  
Both of these results are supported by the metrics gathered in the simulations. 
However, these advantages come with a price.  All simulations showed an increase in 
data throughput between all blue force platforms by as much as 150%.  Additionally, one 
group did manage an “almost FORCEnet” scenario in which only the US forces worked 
in a network centric fashion while the other platforms participated in a traditional way.10  
None of the advantages of network centricity were realized, indicating it’s an “all or 
nothing” proposition. 
The unusual result referred to in the beginning of this section occurred because one group 
placed less capable (non-FORCEnet) platforms in the outer screens of the battlegroup.  
The net result was a reduction in overall performance of the battlegroup because of an 
increase in overall system response times.  Analysis of the scenario quickly pinpointed 
the cause of the anomaly and the scenario was re-run with results consistent with the rest 
of the analysis.  It did highlight the fact that care must be taken in how ships are 
positioned when there is a mixture of capable and less capable ships. 
 
The study was considered a success.  It quantified the effectiveness of coalition 
FORCEnet in terms that are directly applicable to war fighting capability.  Even though 
some results were inconclusive, the members of TTCP’s AG-6 from five different nations 
appreciate the advantage of having a partial answer to the question “how much is a pound 
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of FORCEnet worth.”  They have incorporated the results and lessons learned into their 
overall study plan. 
 
Ongoing and Future Work 
 
The group of students currently involved in the follow-on analytic work has fewer 
students than the original groups.  However, like before, they come from two different 
classes and they are divided between two localities.  They will revisit the ESG portion of 
the study using a Philippine humanitarian relief scenario with eight vignettes that add 
some granularity to the communications architecture based on planned coalition “C2 
Order of Battle.”  Each group is working independently, but their goals are the same.  
Specifically, their goal is to conduct a sensitivity analysis to determine if there is a “knee 
in the curve” of effectiveness versus investment cost, and to analyze enemy use of more 
pervasive information warfare on the coalition C2 architecture. 
The nature of the ESG lends itself to accommodating coalition enhancements to give a 
scalable and composable force.  The intent of the study is to quantify the degree to which 
FORCEnet (Fn) improves the probability of successfully completing its mission. Specific 
ESG coalition capability options to explore in the modeling are shown in the below table. 
Option Description 
I (do nothing)  
 
Small size (all US) ESG force, fully Fn 
capable 
II (do minimum)    Added Coalition ships, but not Fn capable (i.e. 
larger overall force) 
III  Intermediate Fn capability to the additional 
Coalition ships 
IV Full Fn capability to entire force 
 
One major difference between the results presented in this paper and the current work is 
that the Concept of Analysis (CoA) for AG-6 modeling now includes both high- and low-
level operational Analysis (OA).  The high level work is essentially at the campaign 
outcome level, while the lower level work is at the vignette or encounter level.  This work 
is recognized as an integral part of the AG-6 overall study plan and will be incorporated 
into that group’s final report. 
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